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Income inequality increased in Sweden during the 1980’s and 90’s as did
the returns to higher education. The main conclusion of this study is that
increased income inequality between high and low skilled workers is demand
driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in produc-
tion. Increased investments in new, more eﬃcient capital equipment, together
w i t has l o w d o w ni nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fs k i l l e dl a b o r ,h a v er a i s e dt h er a t i oo f
eﬀective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the
relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capital-skill
complementarity mechanism.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Income inequality increased in Sweden during the 1980’s and 90’s. Between 1981
and 2000, the aggregate P90/P10 ratio of logged wages rose by 18 percent.1 It rose
by 26 percent for men and by 30 percent for private sector employees (le Grand et
al., 2001). Similar rises in wage inequality have been experienced in many OECD
countries during this time period. These changes in wage diﬀerentials appear to
have been driven by increases in wages in the upper end of the wage distribution
(Katz and Autor, 1999; le Grand et al., 2001). This has led many researchers to
focus their attention on the contemporaneous rise in the economic returns to higher
education.2
In Sweden, the university wage premium for full-time workers estimated using
the Swedish Level of Living Survey rose by 13 percent between 1991 and 2000.3
Statistics Sweden reports that the university wage premium for white-collar males
in Swedish industry rose by 20 percent between 1983 and 1999, while the university
wage premium for all men in the Swedish private sector increased by even more
(Davis, 1992; SCB1).4 At the same time, the supply of university educated workers
was growing. The number of workers with a university degree increased by 20 percent
between 1983 and 1999 (SCB6). Together, these facts leave us with the following
question: Why has the university wage premium risen in Sweden during a period of
substantial growth in the relative supply of university educated workers?
This question will be examined using a neoclassical growth framework based on
recent work by Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante (2000) (hereafter KORV).
Their inﬂuential study proposes an explanation of the even more dramatic rise in
the university wage premium experienced in the United States during this time.
They argue that the falling relative price of capital equipment (due to equipment-
1P90 and P10 stand for the 90th and 10th percentiles of the distribution of logged wages.
2See Katz and Autor (1999) for an overview of this literature.
3Author’s estimate as reported in Section 3.
4The rise in the Swedish university wage premium is documented and discussed in more detail
in Gustavsson (2004).
2speciﬁc technological change) has led to increased investment and, subsequently, to
an increase in the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker in the economy. This
raises the market return to higher education (which is used as a proxy for skills)
through the capital-skill complementarity mechanism.5
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the capital-skill com-
plementarity mechanism can be used to help explain rising income inequality in
Sweden. This will be done by applying the KORV model to Swedish data.6
The Swedish experience is an especially interesting test case for the KORV model.
The historical development of the Swedish skill premium diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
that of the US skill premium. In particular, Sweden experienced an unprecedented
drive towards wage equality between 1967 and 1983. Diﬀerences in labor market
institutions also make Sweden an excellent (albeit tough) test case for the theory and
model presented in KORV. Since institutional models and explanations dominate
the Swedish debate on relative wage determination,7 our a priori belief should be
that a simple, market oriented model will not be able to explain movements in the
skill premium in Sweden: at least not very well.
What we ﬁnd instead, is that the KORV model can account quite well for move-
ments in the Swedish skill premium. The main conclusion of this study is that
increased income inequality between high and low skilled workers is demand driven
and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production. Since
1985, increased investments in new, more eﬃcient capital equipment, together with
a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, have raised the ratio of eﬀective capi-
tal inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the relative demand (and
market return) for skilled labor through the capital-skill complementarity mecha-
5Griliches (1969) formalized the idea of capital-skill complementarity and showed it to be a key
feature of modern production technology.
6Batista (2002) applied the KORV model to Portuguese data and found that the capital-skill
complementarity mechanism could explain a signiﬁcant share of the changes in the skill premium
in Portugal.
7See e.g. Flam (1987), Edin and Holmlund (1995), Hibbs and Locking (1996), Edin and Topel
(1997), Arai and Kjellström (1999), Lindquist (2000).
3nism.8
Rising wage inequality between high and low skilled workers has received consid-
erable attention in the Anglo-American literature. Notable studies include Bound
and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992) and, more recently, KORV. In con-
trast, the Swedish (and continental European) debate has paid less attention to
r i s i n gw a g ei n e q u a l i t ya n df o c u s e dm o r eo nt h el a r g ed r o pi nd e m a n df o rl o ws k i l l e d
workers and subsequent unemployment among the low skilled (see e.g. Nickell and
Bell, 1995; and for Sweden, see e.g. Mellander, 1999; Hansson, 2000; Anderton et
al. 2002). The arguments and explanations within this debate are very similar to
those found in the Anglo-American literature.
These explanations can be placed into three (not necessarily exclusive) cate-
gories; supply eﬀects, demand eﬀects and institutional eﬀects. Institutional eﬀects
include a fall in the union wage premium and changes in wage-bargaining frame-
works. Supply eﬀects include both changes in the quantity of skilled labor and in
(unobservable) labor quality.9 Demand eﬀects are attributed to increasing trade with
low wage countries (which includes outsourcing of low-skilled production tasks),10 to
trade induced sector-biased technological change,11 and to skill-biased technological
change.12 The KORV model used in this paper provides us with a speciﬁc, economic
interpretation of skill-biased technological change, as well as a hypothesis which can
be tested using observable factor quantities and prices. KORV argue that the resid-
ual trend in labor productivity used by many authors to explain the increase in
the skill premium is, in fact, a proxy for the omitted capital-skill complementarity
variable.13
8This ﬁnding is similar to Hansson’s (2000) conclusion that the accumulation of physical and
knowledge capital increased the demand for skilled labor in Swedish manufacturing during the late
1980’s and early 1990’s.
9For Sweden, see Edin and Holmlund (1995) and Mellander (1999).
10For empirical studies using Swedish data, see e.g. Hansson (2000) and Anderton et al. (2002).
11For a multi-sector, applied general equilibrium model of a small open economy, see De Santis
(2002, 2003).
12For Sweden, see Mellander (1999), Hansson (2000) and Anderton et al. (2002).
13Bound and Johnson (1992) evaluate the evidence concerning the impact of these diﬀerent eﬀects
on the wage-structure in the United States during the 1980’s. Their analysis, ”points strongly to the
4The remainder of this study is outlined as follows. The KORV model is presented
in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, the Swedish data are examined in the light of this
model. This initial examination shows us that the data are consistent with the
capital-skill complementarity hypothesis.
The quantitative analysis and results are presented in Section 4. First, the full
econometric model is presented. Then, the main parameters of interest in the bench-
mark model are estimated using a simulated pseudo-maximum likelihood method.
These parameters are used in a decomposition experiment which demonstrates the
importance of the capital-skill complementarity mechanism for explaining rising in-
come inequality in Sweden.
This is followed by two alternative experiments. The ﬁrst experiment includes a
t r e n di nt h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of skilled labor. The second includes a trend in the
eﬃciency of capital equipment. Allowing for unobservable trends improves the ﬁt
of the model and delivers some interesting results. It does not, however, change the
main conclusion which arose from the analysis of the benchmark model. Increased
income inequality between high and low skilled workers is still demand driven and
is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The KORV model is a two sector model of the production side of the economy. One
sector produces new capital equipment, xet, and the other produces consumption
conclusion that the principal reason for the increase in wage diﬀerentials by educational attainment
and the decrease in the gender diﬀerential is a combination of skilled-labor-biased technological
change and changes in unmeasured labor quality” (p. 389). Katz and Murphy (1992) report
similar results. As such, the leading explanations of growth in the skill premium in the United
States during the 1980’s and ’90’s have relied upon a residual trend in labor productivity, which
has been labeled as either skilled-biased technological change or as increases in unmeasured labor
quality.



















Both sectors have access to a common production function, G(·), which is homoge-
neous of degree one and use capital structures, kst, capital equipment, ket, skilled
labor, st, and unskilled labor, ut, to produce output. Both sectors have access to
a common technology, at. The equipment producing sector also has access to an
equipment-speciﬁc technology, qt, which represents the embodiment of IT advance-
ments.
Assuming perfect competition, aggregate output (in terms of consumption units)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
yt = ct + xst +
xet
qt
= atG(kst,k et,u t,s t). (3)
The evolution of capital is given by
ks,t+1 =( 1 − δs)kst + xst (4)
ke,t+1 =( 1 − δe)ket + xet, (5)
where δs,a n dδe, are the depreciation rates for structures and equipment, respec-
tively.
The KORV model uses a four-factor, constant returns to scale production func-
tion which is Cobb-Douglas over structures and a CES function of the three remain-
ing factors of production
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where α, µ, λ ∈ (0,1) and σ, ρ ∈ (−∞,1). The CES parameter weights on unskilled
6labor and equipment are given by µ and λ, respectively. In equilibrium, the income
share of structures will be equal to the technological parameter α.T h e t w o k e y
substitution parameters are σ and ρ.
The elasticity of substitution between equipment and skilled labor, Skes,i se q u a l
to 1/(1 − ρ). The elasticity of substitution between equipment and unskilled labor,
Skeu, and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, Ssu,a r e
both equal to 1/(1 − σ). The hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity implies
σ>ρ .
Inputs of capital equipment and labor are measured in eﬃciency units. Skilled
labor inputs are deﬁned as st ≡ ψstnsthst. Unskilled labor inputs are deﬁned as
ut ≡ ψutnuthut. The number of each type of worker is given by nit and hit is the
average number of hours worked by each type of worker. Inputs of capital equipment
are deﬁned as ket ≡ ψete ket,w h e r ee ket is the stock of capital equipment unadjusted
for changes in quality.14
The eﬃciency of a unit of factor input i ∈ {u,s,e} is given by the exogenous
index ψit. The logs of these eﬃciency indices, log(ψit) ≡ ϕit, are modeled as trend
stationary processes15
ϕit = ϕi0 + γit +  it, (7)
where the  it’s are normally distributed i.i.d. shocks to the eﬃciency of capital
equipment and labor with mean zero and covariance matrix Ω.E a c ht y p ei input
has an initial level of eﬃciency given by ϕi0 and the eﬃciency of each type i input
grows at rate γi. Together, Equations 6 and 7 give us a fully speciﬁed, stochastic
production function.
14Allowing for a trend in the eﬃciency of capital equipment is a slight modiﬁcation of the original
KORV model. They have a quality adjusted measure of capital equipment, ket.N os u c hm e a s u r e
exists for Sweden. Instead, an unadjusted measure of capital equipment is used, e ket. Including ψet
in the model, allows us to examine the potential eﬀect of increasing equipment eﬃciency on the
skill premium. This will be done in Section 4.
15The implications of this trend stationary speciﬁcation and the potential consequences of alter-
native speciﬁcations are discussed in Ohanian, Violante, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2000) which is a
technical companion paper to KORV.
7The skill premium in the KORV model is deﬁned as the ratio of skilled to un-
skilled wages, which, under the assumption of perfect competition, is equal to the






























Equation 8 expresses the skill premium as a function of relative factor inputs. It
provides us with a way of using the KORV model to understand how changes in
factor inputs aﬀect the skill premium by decomposing the skill premium into its
fundamental components; the relative quantity eﬀect,t h erelative eﬃciency eﬀect,
and the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect.
T h er e l a t i v eq u a n t i t y( R Q )e ﬀect says that when skilled hours grow at a faster
rate than unskilled hours the skill premium will fall (recall that σ<1).T h i si st h e
same as Edin and Holmlund’s (1995) supply-side eﬀect.
T h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency (RE) eﬀect depends on the sign of the substitution para-
meter, σ. If σ>0, then the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor
is greater than one which means that they are substitutes for one another in the
production process. In this case, when the eﬃciency of skilled labor grows faster
than that of unskilled labor, the skill premium will rise. It is this kind of (inherently
unobservable) trend which Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992)
used to explain movements in the skill premium.16
The third eﬀect is the capital-skill complementarity (CSC) eﬀect. If skilled labor
and capital equipment are complementary factors of production, i.e. if σ>ρ ,
then increases in the quantity and/or quality of the one will increase the marginal
productivity of the other. So, as the stock of capital increases and as the quality of
16The relative eﬃciency eﬀect is modeled here as a supply-side eﬀect, i.e. as unobservable
changes in the quality of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor. In other settings, this type of
unobservable trend has been modeled on the demand-side. In these cases, it is often labeled as
skill-biased technological change.
8new investments improves, the wage for skilled workers will ceteris paribus increase.17
3T h e D a t a
The KORV model will be estimated using annual Swedish data from 1970 to 1999.18
The measure of the skill premium, wst/wut, used in this study is the university wage
premium for white-collar men in mining, manufacturing and construction. This
series will act as a proxy for the return to skills for all workers in the Swedish
economy, since an equivalent, aggregate measure does not exist.
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Figure 1: The University Wage Premium in Sweden, 1967-2000.
In Figure 1, we see that the skill premium for male employees in Swedish industry
fell by 27 percent between 1967 and 1983 and then rose by 20 percent between 1983
and 1999. Time series data from Statistics Sweden (SCB) show a similar rise for
all workers during the 1990’s. Using panel data, Edin and Holmlund (1995) report
17Studies by Bergström and Panas (1992), Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Mellander (1999),
Hansson (2000) and Anderton et al. (2002) have all found capital-skill complementarity to be
present in the production process in Sweden.
18Details concerning data construction and sources can be found in Appendix A.
9a fall in the university wage premium followed by a weak upturn during the mid
1980’s.19 Gustavsson (2004) documents a steady increase in the university wage
premium beginning in the early 1980’s. Estimates using the Swedish Level of Living
Survey (SLLS) are also reported in Figure 1.20 On the whole, the data in Figure
1 show us that the skill premium used in this paper may, in fact, be a reasonable
proxy for trends in the university wage premium for all workers.21




















































































































Figure 2: Aggregate factor Inputs, 1970-1999.
19Edin and Holmlund (1995) estimate the university wage premium using both the Swedish Level
of Living Survey and the Swedish Household Survey.
20These estimates were carried out by the author. First, the results of Arai and Kjellström
(2001) and le Grand et al. (2001) were replicated. Then, the variable for years of schooling was
replaced with the variable for educational categories, using high school as the reference category.
21This is not, however, an uncontroversial assumption. The time series data are not standardized
for diﬀerences in the age structure of the two categories of workers. The time series data may also
e x a g g e r a t et h ei n c r e a s ei nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y .T h e r ei s an extraordinarily large jump in the time series
occurring in 1987 and Statistics Sweden does not report any obvious candidate for this jump (i.e.
there is no mention of any particular deﬁnitional changes, data collection problems, etc.). They
did, however, revise their measure in 2000. This revision lowered the university wage premium (for
that year), moving it closer to the author’s estimate from the SLLS shown in Figure 1.
10Figure 2 shows aggregate time series of capital equipment, e ket, capital structures,
kst, the number of skilled workers, nst, and the number of unskilled workers, nut.
Average hours worked by skilled and unskilled workers, hit, ﬂuctuate quite a bit at
business cycle frequencies, but show no tendency to trend up or down between 1970
and 1999 (SCB5). Thus, the number of workers, nit, is an appropriate measure of
the long run, potential supply of both types of labor and hit will be normalized to
one in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the number of unskilled workers includes
those who are unemployed as well as latent job seekers. This is done in order to
insure that nut can be treated as the exogenous, long run supply of unskilled labor
in our estimations.22
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St r uct ures
Figure 3: Relative Price Indices for Equipment and Structures, 1970-2000.
Both equipment and structures have been deﬂated using the appropriate price
index.23 The prices of equipment and structures relative to consumption are shown
in Figure 3. The relative price of structures is nearly constant until about 1990.
22See Appendix B for a more thorough discussion of this topic.
23The price index for equipment used in KORV is quality adjusted. Unfortunately, the same
kind of quality adjusted price index does not exist for Sweden. However, a model with a trend in
the eﬃciency of capital equipment, ψet, will be estimated in Section 4.
11Between 1990 and 1994, the relative price of structures dropped dramatically; read-
justing to a new, lower level in the aftermath of the Swedish banking and real estate
crises. The relative price of equipment, on the other hand, has been decreasing
steadily since 1974. KORV interpret a similar decline in the relative price of equip-
ment in the United States as a proxy for equipment-speciﬁc technological change. In
the KORV model, and in the empirical analysis in this paper, the relative price index
of structures is set equal to one, while qt is the relative price index for equipment
s h o w ni nF i g u r e3 .
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Figure 4: Relative Factor Inputs, 1970-1999.
Re-examining Equation 8, we see that the skill premium can be aﬀected by
changes in both the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor and by changes in the ratio
of capital equipment per skilled worker. If we examine the graphs of these factor
input ratios in Figure 4, we see that there has, in fact, been an increase in the
relative supply of skilled labor, particularly before 1985, after which the growth in
12skilled labor stagnated. This would tend to support the supply-side hypothesis.
But we also see a strong correlation (equal to 0.70) between the skill premium and
the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker. In Figure 4, we see that the
ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker exhibits the same two trends as the
skill premium: a falling trend after 1970 and a rising trend after 1985. Thus, a
preliminary examination of the raw data supports the hypothesis of capital-skill
complementarity as a potentially important factor behind movements in the skill
premium.
4 The Quantitative Analysis
4.1 The Econometric Model
The econometric model consists of three structural equations which are derived
from the proﬁt maximizing conditions of the ﬁrm under the assumption of perfect
competition. These three equations are; the labor share equation, the wage-bill ratio
equation and the no arbitrage equation
wstnst + wutnut
yt
= lsht (ψt,Xt;φ) (9)
wstnst
wutnut















where ψt ≡ {ψut,ψst,ψet} is the vector of eﬃciency indices, Xt ≡ {ket,k st,n st,n ut}
is the vector of exogenous factor inputs,24 Et is the expectations operator, and φ ≡
{δs,δe,α,µ,λ,σ,ρ,ηe,γi,ϕ i0,Ω} is the vector of model parameters. The parameter
ηe is deﬁned below.
Equation 9 is the labor Share equation. It has labor’s share of income as its
24Recall that hit has been normalized to 1. See Section 3.
13dependent variable. The right hand side of this equation is comprised of the the-
oretical counterpart from the model. Equation 10 is the wage-bill ratio equation,
which has the ratio of the wage-bill for skilled to unskilled labor as its dependent
variable and on the right hand side the theoretical counterpart from the model.
Equation 11 is a no arbitrage equation which acts as a proxy for the unobservable
rental rates of capital equipment and capital structures. It equates the expected,
future (t+1) returns on investments in equipment and structures. The left hand side
of this equation is the date t+1return on investments in structures, which consists
of two components. The ﬁrst component, (1 − δs), is the share of undepreciated





, is the marginal product of capital structures. The right
hand side of the equation is the date t +1return on investments in equipment,
which also consists of two components. The ﬁrst component, Et (qt/qt+1)(1− δe),i s
the share of undepreciated capital equipment carried over from the previous period
multiplied by the expected rate of change in the relative price of capital equipment.




, is the marginal product of capital
equipment.25
The parameter vector φ in Equations 9-11 includes 20 parameters. Given the
small sample size and the complications each additional parameter adds to the
optimization routine used to estimate the model, it is appropriate to reduce the
dimension of this vector. This can be done by calibrating several of the parameters
in advance of the estimation procedure. The calibration process is discussed in
detail in Appendix B. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. The remaining
25There are four simplifying assumptions made in this no arbitrage equation all of which are
addressed thoroughly in KORV and in Ohanian, Violante, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2000), which is
a technical companion paper to KORV. First, they assume that there is no risk premium, which
means that we can ignore the covariance between consumption and returns in the estimation.
Second, they assume that there is equal tax treatment of the two types of capital goods. Third,
they replace the expression Et (qt/qt+1)(1− δe) with (1 − δe)qt/qt+1 + εt,w h e r eεt is the i.i.d.








. Fourth, they assume that at+1 and ϕit+1 are known when investment decisions
are made. Thus, qt+1 is the only unknown.
14parameters to be estimated are {µ,λ,σ,ρ,γi,ϕ i0}. The benchmark model has no
trend, so γs = γu = γe = 0 and ϕs0 is normalized to zero, while ϕe0 is normalized
to one.
Table 1: Predetermined Parameters in the Benchmark Model.
αδ e δs ηe ηωu = ηωs ηωe ηωij γs γu γe ϕs0 ϕe0
0.1896 0.125 0.05 0.017 0.0185 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4.2 Findings From the Benchmark Model
The model is estimated using a simulated pseudo-maximum likelihood method.26
Estimates of the substitution parameters are reported in Table 2 (standard errors
are in parentheses). The parameter estimates show that production is, in fact,
characterized by strong capital-skill complementarity. The substitution parameter
σ is positive and signiﬁcantly larger than the negative substitution parameter ρ.
These estimates conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Bergström and Panas (1992), Machin and
Van Reenen (1998), Mellander (1999), Hansson (2000) and Anderton et al. (2002).
Table 2: Parameter Estimates and Substitution Elasticities.
σρ Suke = Sus= 1
1−σ Sske= 1
1−ρ
0.2873 −0.9344 1.40 0.52
(0.0097)
a (0.0179)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
The elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital equipment,
Suke, is 1.40. This implies that they are substitutes for one another in the pro-
duction process. The elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital
equipment, Sske, is 0.52, which implies that they are complementary factor inputs.
Both estimates are well within the reasonable boundaries marked out in the empir-
26See Appendix B for details.
15ical literature reviewed in Hamermesh (1993).27
Figure 5 shows us that the econometric model works well along all three dimen-
sions. The no arbitrage condition is fulﬁlled (on average). The model wage-bill
tracks the actual wage bill relatively closely and the average labor share of income
in the model is equal to that found in the data.
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Figure 5: Results from the Benchmark Model.
The model skill premium is shown in the lower right panel of Figure 5. It matches
the skill premium in the data quite well. It captures both of the major trends found
in the data. The model produces a sharp downturn after 1970 and a sharp rise after
1985. Thus, we can conclude that the KORV model is able to predict movements in
27KORV report estimates of Suke =1 .67 and Sske =0 .67 for the aggregate US economy.
Lindquist (2001) reports estimates of Suke =1 .95 and Sske =0 .73 for Swedish Industry. Both
KORV and Lindquist (2001) use hours worked as a measure of labor input, while this study uses
the number of workers as a measure of labor inputs. The fact that the estimates in Table 2 are
lower than the estimates reported by KORV and Lindquist (2001) is probably because it is easier
to substitute between hours and equipment than people and equipment.
16the Swedish skill premium.28 This is done using only observable data on quantities
and prices of factor inputs.
Changes in the skill premium from the benchmark model can be decomposed
into their two primary components; the capital-skill complementarity (CSC) eﬀect
and the relative quantity (RQ) eﬀect. The results of this exercise are reported in
Table 3. The capital-skill complementarity eﬀect is clearly dominant and explains
(on average) 63 percent of the changes in the model skill premium in Sweden between
1970 and 1999.29
Table 3: Decomposition of Changes in the Model Skill Premium.
suk e Total
CSC-eﬀect 31% 0 32% 63%
RQ-eﬀect 30% 7% 0 37%
Total 61% 7% 32% 100%
The impact of an increase in the number of skilled workers on the skill premium
i st w o f o l di nt h i sm o d e l .I th a sad i r e c t ,n e g a t i v ee ﬀect through the relative quantity
eﬀect and a, perhaps, less obvious, negative impact through the capital-skill com-
plementarity eﬀect. Changes in capital equipment and unskilled labor each have
only one channel through which they can eﬀect the skill premium, the capital-skill
complementarity eﬀe c ta n dt h er e l a t i v eq u a n t i t ye ﬀect, respectively.
Each of these eﬀects can be decomposed (exactly) into two components by setting
the growth rate of one factor input to zero while allowing the other to move with
the data. For example, the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect can be decomposed
into two components by ﬁrst setting the growth rate of capital equipment to zero,
while still allowing for growth in skilled labor. Then, set the growth rate of skilled
labor to zero and allow for growth in capital equipment. A similar decomposition
28The correlation between the skill premium in the data and the model skill premium is 0.73.
29The importance of the CSC-eﬀect is actually growing over time (see Figure 6).
17c a nb em a d ef o rt h er e l a t i v eq u a n t i t ye ﬀect by ﬁrst setting the growth rate of skilled
labor to zero and then by setting the growth rate of unskilled labor to zero.
Table 3 summarizes these results and shows us to what extent each factor input
is responsible for changes in the skill premium and through which channel it aﬀects
the skill premium. On average, during the sample period from 1970 to 1999, 61
percent of the changes in the skill premium can be attributed to changes in the
quantity of skilled labor. This impact on the skill premium was through two equally
important channels, the capital-skill complementarity eﬀect and the relative quantity
eﬀect. Changes in the capital stock account for 32 percent of the changes in the
skill premium, while changes in the supply of unskilled labor was responsible for 7
percent of the changes in the skill premium.
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Figure 6: The Capital-Skill Complementarity Eﬀect and the Relative Quantity Ef-
fect.
Figure 6 illustrates the cumulative impact of the capital-skill complementarity
and relative quantity eﬀects upon the skill premium in Sweden between 1970 and
1999. The relative quantity eﬀect has had a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the skill
premium until the early 1980’s. After which, it became more neutral. The capital-
18skill complementarity eﬀect has had a more varied impact on the skill premium. But,
what is clear from Figure 6, is that the rise in labor income inequality beginning in
the mid 1980’s is demand driven and due entirely to the capital-skill complementarity
mechanism.
4.3 Findings From the Model With an Unobservable Trend
In order to explore the residual labor productivity hypothesis of Katz and Murphy
(1992) and Bound and Johnson (1992), the KORV model is reestimated allowing
for a nonzero trend in the relative growth rate of the eﬃciency of skilled labor, gs ≡
γs − γu,w h e r eγu is (still) normalized to zero.30 This added element improves the
model ﬁt( s e eF i g u r e7 ) . 31 It also improves the model’s ability to explain movements
in the skill premium (see the lower right panel of Figure 7).32
The new estimates of σ and ρ are quite similar to those from the benchmark
model (compare the estimates in Table 4 with those in Table 2). The production
process is still characterized by strong capital-skill complementarity. Second, the
structural estimate of gs obtained from the new model speciﬁcation is actually neg-
ative, which tells us that the best solution to the structural model includes a decrease
in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor equal to 1 percent per year. This is, of
course, not what Katz and Murphy (1992) or Bound and Johnson (1992) had in
mind!33 One way of rationalizing this negative trend in the relative eﬃciency of
skilled labor would be to argue that the rapid expansion of the higher education
system in Sweden during this time period resulted in lower educational standards
30See Appendix B for important details concerning this estimation.
31In particular, it improves the ﬁt of the wage bill equation, which, in turn, is closely related to
the equation for the skill premium. This is, of course, a very sensible result given that the labor
share of income and the no arbitrage condition do not trend, while the wage bill does.
32The correlation between the skill premium in the data and the model skill premium is 0.92.
33Running a Katz and Murphy (1992) style regression using the Swedish data results in an
increase in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor equal to 3.5 percent per year.
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Figure 7: Results from the Model with an Unobservable Trend.
and/or the admission of lower quality students.34
Table 4: Parameter Estimates and Substitution Elasticities.
gs σρ Suke= 1
1−σ Sske= 1
1−ρ
−0.01 0.3083 −0.9239 1.45 0.52
(0.0030)
a (0.0405)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
This decline in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor actually pushes the model
skill premium up towards the end of the sample. This is made possible by the
presence of capital-skill complementarity in the production process. When σ>ρ ,
34Arai and Kjellström (1999) also mention the possibility that falling returns to schooling in
Sweden during the 1970’s may, in part, be due to the lower quality of education during times of
great expansion in the educational institutions.
20t h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of skilled labor has two countervailing eﬀects on the skill
premium. First, it has a direct, negative impact through the relative eﬃciency eﬀect.
Second, it has an indirect, positive eﬀect through the capital-skill complementarity
eﬀect, since it raises the stock of capital equipment per unit of skilled labor measured
in eﬃciency units (reexamine Equation 8). Towards the end of the sample, the CSC-
eﬀect dominates, so that the fall in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor leads to a
higher demand (and market return) for skilled workers.
The results of the decomposition experiment are shown in Table 5. The inclusion
of a trend in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor decreases the importance of the
CSC-eﬀect and of changes in the stock of capital equipment. The cumulative impact
of each of the three eﬀe c t si ss h o w ni nF i g u r e8 .
Table 5: Decomposition of Changes in the Model Skill Premium (gs < 0).
su k e gs Total
CSC-eﬀect 14% 0 5% 15% 34%
RQ-eﬀect 36% 8% 0 0 44%
RE-eﬀect 0 0 0 22% 22%
Total 50% 8% 5% 37% 100%
An alternative formulation of the residual labor productivity hypothesis, would
be to allow for a trend in the eﬃciency of capital equipment. KORV and others
(e.g. Gordon 1990; Greenwood et al., 1997) have argued quite convincingly that
advancements in investment-speciﬁc technology were responsible for the fall in the
relative price of capital equipment (see Figure 3). KORV use (and extend) Gordon’s
(1990) quality adjusted price series for capital equipment in order to take this fact
into account.
To explore the eﬀects of this alternative formulation of the residual labor produc-
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Figure 8: The Capital-Skill Complementarity Eﬀe c t ,T h eR e l a t i v eQ u a n t i t yE ﬀect
and the Relative Eﬃciency Eﬀect (gs < 0).
the stock of capital equipment added to the model, i.e. γs and γu are now both set
to zero, while γe is now allowed to take on a nonzero value.35 . As shown in Table 6,
the parameter estimates are similar to those found in Tables 2 and 4. But now the
unobservable trend is positive, which is more in line with Katz and Murphy (1992)
and Bound and Johnson’s (1992) trend in the demand for skilled workers. Further-
more, when there is capital-skill complementarity in production (as there is here),
this formulation can be readily interpreted as skill-biased technological change.
The model ﬁt is (for all intents and purposes) identical to the ﬁt of the model
with a trend in relative skilled eﬃciency shown previously in Figure 7. Results from
the new decomposition experiment are reported in Table 7. The cumulative impact
35For the sake of simplicity, the eﬃciency of capital equipment is model as a deterministic, linear
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Figure 9: The Capital-Skill Complementarity Eﬀect and the Relative Quantity Ef-
fect (γe > 0).
of the CSC-eﬀect and the RQ-eﬀect are shown in Figure 9.
Table 6: Parameter Estimates and Substitution Elasticities.
γke σρ Suke= 1
1−σ Sske= 1
1−ρ
0.008 0.3093 −0.9236 0 0
(0.0096)
a (0.0429)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Decomposition of Changes in the Model Skill Premium (γke > 0).
su k e γke Total
CSC-eﬀect 19% 0 7% 18% 44%
RQ-eﬀect 45% 11% 0 0 56%
Total 64% 11% 7% 18% 100%
In both of the models which allow for unobservable trends in the demand for
23skilled labor, the importance of the capital-skill complementarity mechanism and the
role of capital equipment is reduced (compare Tables 7 and 5 with Table 3). The
main conclusion concerning wage inequality derived from the benchmark model,
however, remains unchanged. Increased income inequality between high and low
skilled workers is still demand driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill
complementarity in production. This can be seen in Figures 8 and 9.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this study has been to increase our understanding of the underlying
mechanisms responsible for the rise in income inequality in Sweden. The main con-
clusion of this study is that increased income inequality between high and low skilled
workers is demand driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementar-
ity in production. Increased investments in new, more eﬃcient capital equipment,
together with a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, have raised the ra-
tio of eﬀective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the
relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capital-skill com-
plementarity mechanism. A clear connection between macroeconomic developments
and income inequality has been established which shows that investments in capital
equipment and higher education aﬀect the structure of relative wages in Sweden.
Previous research has shown that the capital-skill complementarity mechanism
illustrated in this paper can also be used successfully to help us understand increas-
ing wage dispersion (Caselli, 1999) and the behavior of the skill premium over the
business cycle (Lindquist, 2004). Together, these and other studies, allow us to con-
clude that capital-skill complementarity is an important ingredient in a successful,
competitive theory of relative wages and that such a theory can, in fact, help us to
understand changes in the structure of relative wages.
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27A Data Appendix
The skill premium used in this study was constructed using full-time equivalent,
monthly salaries for male white-collar workers in Swedish mining, manufacturing
and construction (SNI 2, 3 and 5). Skilled workers are those who have 3 or more
years of post-secondary education. Unskilled workers are those who have at least
three years of secondary education. These categories are roughly equivalent to US
college and high school graduates, respectively. For the years 1970 to 1991, these
ﬁgures were taken from Fredriksson (1997). For the years 1992 to 1999 the ﬁgures
are taken from Statistics Sweden’s yearly publication, Salaries for Employees in the
Private Sector (SCB9).
Values for capital equipment and capital structures can be found in the Swedish
National Accounts published by Statistics Sweden (SCB4, SCB7, SCB8). Statistics
Sweden changed their reporting methods for capital stocks in 1980. This change
created a drop in the level between the series k1970−1981 and k1980−1999. To correct
for this downward shift due to the change in methodology, we can use the two
overlapping observations for 1980 and 1981and calculate an adjustment weight. We
can then correct for this level shift by multiplying the old series with the adjustment
weight. This gives us ke,1970−1999 = 0.7757∗ke,1970−1979:1∗ke,1980−1999 and ks,1970−1999
= 0.9448 ∗ ks,1967−1979:1 ∗ ks,1980−1999. The splicing together of these two time series
should not be problematic, since we are mainly interested in changes in the capital
stock from year to year and not in the level of the capital stock.
The supply of skilled and unskilled workers for the whole economy are calculated
from Statistic Sweden’s Annual Labor Force Survey (SCB6). Once again, skilled
workers are those who have 3 or more years of post secondary education. Unskilled
workers, however, are calculated by taking all workers, subtracting the number of
skilled workers, and then adding both unemployed workers and latent job seekers.
These ﬁgures are also taken from Statistic Sweden’s Annual Labor Force Survey
(SCB6).
Prices indices for capital structures, capital equipment and consumption are
taken from AMECO (a European Commission Database). The labor share of income
is calculated using total labor costs (including taxes) and total value added (in factor
prices) as reported in the Swedish National Accounts published by Statistics Sweden
(SCB2, SCB3, SCB4).
B Econometric Appendix
There are several simulation-based estimation techniques suitable for estimating
the parameters of the nonlinear state-space model comprised of Equations 9 - 11.
Three such approaches are investigated in Ohanian, Violante, Krusell and Ríos-
Rull (2000) (henceforth OVKR), which is a technical companion paper to KORV;
numerical and stochastic integration, extended Kalman ﬁlter with indirect inference
28correction, and simulated pseudo-maximum likelihood (SPML).36 After conducting
a number of Monte Carlo experiments, they compare the performance of these three
alternative estimators given the particular model speciﬁcation with trend stationary,
latent state variables and a small sample size of 30 observations. They conclude that
under these conditions the SPML method performs best in terms of precision and
computational eﬃciency.
This method hinges on Xt being strongly exogenous. Assuming that the stocks
of capital equipment and capital structures are exogenous does not appear to be
problematic. For even if current investments may be correlated with the shocks
to labor productivity, the stock variables, themselves, move slowly over time and
should not be correlated with contemporaneous shocks to labor productivity. There
is, however, reason to believe that hours worked and employment are correlated with
shocks to labor productivity. That is why the estimation is done using the number of
skilled and unskilled workers in the economy. This is also why unemployed workers
and latent job seekers are included in the measure for unskilled labor. The number
of skilled and unskilled workers should more closely reﬂect the exogenous, long
run supply of skilled and unskilled labor and are most likely not correlated with
contemporaneous shocks to labor productivity.
The parameter vector φ includes 20 parameters. Given the small sample size
at hand (30 observations) it seems appropriate to try and reduce the dimension of
this vector. This can be done by calibrating several of the parameters and making
some simplifying assumptions. First, the depreciation rates δs and δe are calibrated
to equal 0.05 and 0.125, respectively. These values are the same as those used by
Statistics Sweden in producing the estimates of the two capital stocks used in this
paper. They are also identical to those used in KORV.
The income share of structures, α, is calculated from the data as the average













where θt is the labor share of income at time t.
The standard error of the forecast error ηe is estimated as (1 − δe) times the
standard error of the residuals of an ARMA(1,2) model of qt+1/qt. The estimated
equation has an R
2
=0 .65 and b σε =0 .019. So that ηe equals 0.017.
The dimensionality of φ can be reduced further by assuming that the covariance

















Under this set of assumptions, labor shocks have identical variance and zero covari-
ance, i.e. ηω = η s = η u and η ij = 0. The variance of shocks to labor eﬃciency,
36For an overview of these types of simulation-based econometric methods see Gouriéroux and
Monfort (1996).
29η2
 , is obtained as follows. First, the parameters η s and η u are estimated sepa-
rately as the standard errors from an ARMA(4,4) process for skilled labor hours and
an ARMA(4,3) process for unskilled labor hours.37 Both equations have R
2
=0 .99.
Then, the standard errors of these two equations are made comparable by dividing
each by the mean of the appropriate dependent variable. This results in η s =0 .018
and η u =0 .019. Thus, the assumption that ηω = η s = η u appears to be a rea-
sonable one and ηω is set equal to 0.0185. The correlation coeﬃcient of the residuals
from these two forecasting equations is equal to 0.03. As such, the assumption of
zero covariance between the shocks to labor eﬃciency appears plausible as well.
This set of assumptions also turns oﬀ the shocks to the eﬃciency of capital
equipment. So that, ϕet becomes a deterministic time trend equal to ϕe0+γet.T h i s
representation is the one most similar to the quality adjustments made to the data
in the original KORV model.
Laroque and Salanié (1989) have shown that SPML estimators, such as the ones
used in this paper are free from approximation bias and that the SPML estimator
is consistent and asymptotically normal (see also Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996).
Their results, however, are asymptotic and are applicable to stationary environments
only. Here, we have a nonstationary environment with trends in the latent variables
and in the times series for factor prices and quantities. Furthermore, the sample
used here is to small to rely upon asymptotic results.
These complications have been dealt with quite thoroughly in OVKR. In this
paper, they use Monte Carlo techniques to analyze the small sample properties of the
SPML estimator. They ﬁnd that when the latent process is trend stationary, there is
very little mean and median bias in the estimated parameters of the model even when
the number of simulations performed is as low as 10. Simulating the model 50 times,
they ﬁnd that the mean bias is essentially zero for they key curvature parameters σ
and ρ. The parameter estimates in this paper are based on 500 simulations of the
model.
The benchmark model was estimated following the algorithm outlined in Appen-
dix 2 of KORV and in their technical companion paper OVKR. The only diﬀerence
is that they use a two-step method in order to correct for potential endogeneity,
since they are using hours worked as their measure of labor inputs. As mentioned
above, this problem is avoided here by using the number of skilled and unskilled
workers (i.e. the potential labor supply) instead of actual hours worked.
The model which allows for growth in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor inputs
is estimated on a grid of potential values for gs ∈ {−.10,−.09,−.08....0.08,0.09,0.10},
where gs ≡ γs − γu and γu is normalized to zero. That is, the model is estimated
in its entirety for each ﬁxed value of gs. The results from this set of estimations
can then be compared and the parameter estimates associated with the estimated
model for which the three structural equations (9-11) best match the data are the
maximum likelihood estimates. A similar procedure is used when allowing for a
trend in the eﬃciency of capital, γke. Although this estimation procedure required
a ﬁner grid.
37See Lindquist (2001) for more information concerning the data and estimations.
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